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Abstract 
In recent years natural and man-made disasters have highlighted the need for robust supply chain risk management (SCRM) in manufacturing 
firms from a life-cycle perspective (pre-manufacturing, manufacturing, use, post-use stages). Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) provide a 
means to probabilistically represent risk interdependencies and to proactively identify and manage any existing vulnerabilities. In this work, the 
BBN method is implemented for a product in the aerospace industry. Risk network maps are developed to identify interdependencies and 
describe the potential risk propagation behavior during each life-cycle phase and from one phase to another. Due to limited number of 
respondents and lack of certainty with respect to the post-use phase, enhanced methods of risk likelihood assessment are necessary specifically 
for the post-use phase assessment. In this paper two alternate techniques are compared for risk modeling using BBN in such situations: Boolean 
nodes and numeric simulation nodes. Results show that numeric nodes provide a more thorough explanation of the interconnections of the risk 
items modeled. Further enhancement using an approach that combines both BBN and System Dynamics (SD) for SCRM is discussed and 
possible variations for linking variables between SD and BBN are also presented.  
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1. Introduction 
Globalization of supply chains (SC) has increasingly 
exposed organizations to unforeseen events in the form of SC 
disruptions. These are any unplanned events that interrupt the 
flow of goods or materials resulting in negative impacts on 
the SC performance [1]. Quick discovery and response to the 
SC events through better risk management is crucial to the 
minimization of potential impacts.  
Robustly-designed SCs should have the capability to 
perform well under a multitude of potentially harmful 
scenarios. The profit from the manufacture and sale of 
products is one of many possible performance measures 
which may be considered [2]. The impacts of the SC on the 
environment and societal well-being are increasingly 
important measures from a sustainability perspective. 
Connecting potential impact of risk scenarios to the product 
and supply chain design parameters is a difficult and iterative 
learning process which can ultimately lead to a robust design 
for sustainable SC. This robustness (and applicability for 
sustainable assessment) can be increased by considering these 
impacts throughout the multiple life-cycle phases of 
manufacturing.  
This paper presents an application of Bayesian Belief 
Networks (BBN) for probabilistic risk assessment across a 
product’s entire life-cycle. The methodology is presented via 
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its application to an aerospace component manufactured by 
General Electric Aviation (GEA). The methods and inferences 
are generally applicable regardless of industry or product. The 
results indicate that the learning approach gives a better 
representation of the actual level of certainty in risk event 
probabilities for these highly uncertain instances. Potential 
extensions of either BBN method for a better view of supply 
chain risk throughout a products life-cycle with the 
incorporation of System Dynamics (SD) modeling are 
discussed as well.   
2. Background 
2.1 Life-Cycle Assessment and Risk Analysis 
 
A manufactured good’s life-cycle consists of SC activities 
in four phases: pre-manufacturing, manufacturing, use, and 
post-use [3]. Disruptions can occur during any of these stages. 
Life-Cycle Analysis (LCA) is a tool used extensively to assess 
the environmental impacts across the life-cycle and along the 
supply chain. Although LCA provides the details of emissions 
into the environment, there is no clear connection to the 
ultimate impact that these emissions will have on both the 
environment and human health [4]. The field of Risk Analysis 
(RA) from the standpoint of toxicology focuses on estimating 
these types of impacts based on toxin concentration levels. 
Research has examined the possible linkage of LCA with RA 
techniques so that more reliable impact and improvement 
assessments can be attained by interpreting risk as the 
uncertain impact of the reported emissions. One of the 
primary difficulties in impact estimation is the temporal and 
spatial separation of the emissions and their realized effects. 
To begin this process the discharges must be related to 
ambient concentrations of toxins in the atmosphere. Cowell et 
al. [5] emphasize the importance of stakeholder value 
judgments to the ultimate acceptability of LCA conclusions. 
The stakeholders are the impacted party and therefore hold 
important information to the linkage between hazardous 
activity and potential health effects.  
With some unknown but possibly estimable likelihood, a 
disruption may occur along the SC resulting in increased risk 
exposure to humans and environment. These risks also affect 
the economic performance of the SC as they inhibit the ability 
of meeting customer demand. The SC disruption increases 
emissions quantified through LCA. Disruptive events affect 
the total life-cycle cost of assets through increased cost of 
liabilities and regulatory compliance, intangible costs due to 
lost market share, and external costs of disruption due to 
uncontrollable environmental or societal effects [2]. 
Sensitivity analysis performed on LCA data can reveal which 
processes would have the greatest impact if disrupted. 
Uncertainty of LCA data may be a result of difficulty 
experienced in data collection due to company restrictions or 
simply the sheer amount of data needed. In other cases the 
data is inherently stochastic such as is the case with demand 
uncertainty. It was shown that optimization for economic and 
environmental performance was enhanced through the 
consideration of stochastic variables [6]. From a design 
perspective, consideration of data uncertainty improves the 
robustness of performance. In some examples, as in the GEA 
case study discussed in this paper, the analysis is with respect 
to an emerging technology with poorly established or non-
existent use and post-use information introducing data 
uncertainty [7; 8]. Consideration of this knowledge 
uncertainty is a key aim of this research. 
 
2.2 BBN Risk Models 
 
One tool capable of providing probabilistic estimates of 
the likelihood of disruptive events based on expert opinion is 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN). BBN are based on a set of 
conditional probabilities, and as evidence becomes available 
the expected probabilities of disruption occurrence are 
updated. The interrelationship among risk events is made 
explicit, allowing the user to trace the propagation of risks 
from one event to the next and ultimately across life-cycle 
phases. Despite its advantages, BBN is based on the inputs it 
receives from domain-experts and in the case of new products 
or technology this domain knowledge may not exist. 
Uncertainty inherent in the first generation life-cycle can only 
be estimated; the issue of confidence in the estimates becomes 
relevant.  
A variety of studies have used BBN to analyze how risks 
and disruptions influence SCs. The BBN approach has proven 
to be a powerful tool when uncertainty is an important factor 
[1] and allows easy visualization of the network through its 
graphical nature. This makes it easy to localize a problem or 
identify vulnerable areas in the network. 
Badurdeen et al. [9] outline a structured approach to 
BBN-enabled SCRM based on the existing ISO framework 
[10]. This approach is applied to a multi-tier supply chain 
wherein risk events are interdependent and the occurrence of 
one event in a supplier has the ability to increase likelihood of 
disruptions at the focal company. Amundson et al. [11] further 
highlight how this approach can be applied in supplier 
evaluation as well as for analysis of internal risk exposure. In 
related work Brown et al. [12] present a possible approach to 
connecting disruption likelihood with impact measures 
determined through linkages from BBN to Discrete Event 
Simulation (DES).  
Though powerful, BBN-based risk analysis is limited by 
its inability to handle feedback relationships. Due to linear 
propagation of conditional relationships in BBNs, the 
reinforcing and balancing feedback relationships may not be 
fully captured. This drawback may be remediated through use 
of hybrid models incorporating System Dynamics (this 
concept is expanded upon in section 8). 
3. The Gap 
BBN risk modelling can yield reliable means of 
measuring probabilistic risk exposure. A key issue, however, 
is confidence in expert knowledge and, ultimately, the model 
results. Particularly in scenarios where time horizons are long 
and future conditions are highly uncertain, it can be 
challenging to justify both the inputs and the outputs for 
modelling.  
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How to properly utilize BBN modeling to illicit 
meaningful information given high uncertainty, long time 
horizons, and limited data input for a combined SD-BBN 
scheme remains an unanswered question. 
4. Case Study Description 
An ongoing LCA study at GE Aviation provides the 
backdrop for interest in life-cycle supply chain risk 
assessment (SCRA) with emphasis on the influence of new 
legislation for an emerging aerospace component. In this 
scenario, data for use and post-use SC activities were scarce 
or nonexistent. The reliance on expert opinion from a small 
group of individuals to illicit risk exposure information led to 
research into applicable BBN based methods for probabilistic 
risk assessment. Two alternate modeling methods were 
considered and are compared in this work. The first represents 
risk as probability values calculated directly through an 
application of Bayes’ Rule using averaged input conditional 
probabilities obtained from domain experts. The second 
applies numeric simulation nodes to represent these 
probabilities as distribution functions in order to account for 
uncertainty in the system. This approach to BBN-based risk 
assessment takes uncertainty into account by learning 
probability distribution parameters from the same limited set 
of domain expert opinions. 
5. Methodology 
The procedure described in detail by Badurdeen, et al. [9] 
is followed to first develop the life-cycle risk model structures 
for an aerospace product. To summarize, risk items for each 
life-cycle phase were identified in consultation with industry 
experts. Interconnections among the risks within each phase 
were identified in a similar way yielding a risk network map.  
The resulting set of four risk network maps represents the 
current perception of important probabilistic risk items and 
their interconnections within each life-cycle phase. A high-
level view of risk network maps from each life-cycle phase is 
shown in Figure 1. Due to space limitations, only the post-use 
map is highlighted to show specific details.   
Subsequently, surveys were used to identify conditional 
probabilities for use during the application of Bayes’ Rule. 
Risks were eventually evaluated in accordance with the 
methodology outlined in Badurdeen et al. [9]. In that work, 
Boolean nodes (described in detail next) were used to quantify 
risk probabilities. Because limited respondents were available 
to provide probabilities for influences of potential future 
legislative actions on nascent or nonexistent systems, it was 
desirable to investigate methods for evaluating risk under 
situations with sparse data availability and high levels of 
uncertainty.  
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Figure 1: Aerospace product risk network maps for each life-cycle phase (details shown only for post-use phase)
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5.1. Risk Analysis-Boolean Nodes 
BBN were developed for each risk network map to model 
SC risks. Using Boolean Nodes, a probability of a child risk 
event being true (or false) can be calculated. Starting with the 
first level independent risk events (relevant to a given supply 
chain), and moving one level at a time, the likelihood of each 
event occurring can be calculated by the chain rule application 
of Bayes’ Theorem. If one child risk event is dependent upon 
two parents, the required inputs are then the estimated 
probability of the independent first level events and the 
conditional probability of the occurrence of the dependent 
event (Equation 1). 
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A simple BBN is illustrated in Figure 2, where nodes ‘A’, 
‘B’, and ‘C’ represent any set of three linked risk events. The 
node probability tables (NPT) next to each node present 
probabilities associated with that event. The probability of the 
occurrence of Risk Event C is found through the application 
of Equation 1. 
 
Risk 
Event A 
 P(A)  Risk 
Event B 
 P(B)   
 0.01   0.3   
         
   A B P(C)  
 Risk Event 
C 
 T T 0.95  
  T F 0.8  
   F T 0.4  
   F F 0.05  
       
Figure 2: Example of BBN calculation – P(C=True) = 0.162 
5.2. Risk Analysis-Numeric Nodes 
To examine the influence of uncertainty of inputs, numeric 
nodes were also used to model risk levels in the AgenaRisk© 
software. These nodes utilize a method called dynamic 
discretization to translate continuous distribution functions 
into a discretized form. A detailed discussion of this function 
and its use in the AgenaRisk© environment for distribution 
inference is provided by Neil et al. [13]. In this way, 
probability distributions for a child node can be defined based 
on the same observational evidence used to populate the NPT 
for boolean nodes. It has been assumed that the NPT survey 
responses could be fit to a truncated normal distribution 
between 0 and 1. The mean and variance parameters of this 
truncated normal distribution are assumed to have uniform 
probability between 0 and 1. Entering observational data in 
the BBN allows for inference of the mean and variance shapes 
using the vague uniform prior. Thus, the uncertainty 
associated with informing the risk model using two expert 
opinions is taken into consideration. Figure 3 provides an 
example of such learning. Here, Observer 1 has indicated that 
the probability that a risk (a) is true is 82.5%; observer 2 is 
much less certain and has indicated that the same probability 
is 50%. Both of these observations inform the shape of the 
truncated normal distribution’s mean and variance. In this 
case, the observations indicate that the likelihood of risk a 
being true is somewhat likely with quite a bit of uncertainty: 
the mean of the determined distribution is 52.5%. 
Ultimately, probability distributions for each parameter in 
Equation 1 are estimated in this way and, subsequently, an 
estimate of a connected child node’s probability distribution 
can be obtained. 
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Figure 3: Numeric nodes informed via expert observations. Mean 
and variance priors are uniform. Mean ป 0.525, Variance ป 0.0767 
6. Results 
Applying the two methods, the probability of each risk 
event in the post-use risk network map (bottom-right in Figure 
1) was calculated and the results have been plotted in Figure 
4. Boolean nodes were calculated via a direct application of 
Equation 1 based on probabilities elicited from domain 
experts; means and standard deviations of numeric nodes 
were determined as discussed in section 3. In this case, a 
probability of 50% indicates that, given the expert 
observation, the risk is as equally likely to be true as to be 
false. Therefore, risks with bars favoring the right are seen as 
more likely to be true; those bars to the left of the center line 
indicate less probable risks. Either orientation indicates some 
degree of certainty. It is clear from the figure that, within one 
standard deviation, there are several instances where the 
numeric nodes and Boolean nodes yield similar results 
without statistical significance. However, in general, the 
Boolean modeling reveals much more certainty (i.e. more 
extreme deviation from the 50% probability line) than with 
the numeric node method.  
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7. Comparison of Two Approaches 
The moderation of risk probabilities observed when 
numeric simulation nodes are applied given industry expert 
observation is a direct result of the vague prior assumption 
applied to the problem. Uniform distributions were used to 
build the mean and variance parameters that define a 
truncated normal risk probability distribution for each risk 
item modeled. Because the numeric node method attempts to 
infer the risk probability distribution given limited expert 
knowledge, this assumption is reasonable. As more 
observations are added to the model the results of the numeric 
model ultimately converge to those obtainable from Boolean 
modeling (provided that additional observations reinforce the 
existing ones). Given that the evidence currently informing 
this learning model consists of two probability observations 
for each conditional probability considered, including this 
uncertainty provides a more accurate description of the true 
state of knowledge related to the risks being modeled. What’s 
more, including the variance parameter in numeric modeling 
allows for differences in expert observations to be taken into 
consideration. Focus on Boolean modeling using the mean of 
observations loses this nuance of the data. By explicitly 
considering input variance, this uncertainty is captured. It is 
possible to more realistically prioritize risk management and 
mitigation efforts based on the results from numeric 
modeling, particularly in instances where Boolean modeling 
suggests strong confidence in the probability of an event 
occurrence. The tradeoff for this improved representation of 
knowledge is a much more computationally expensive model. 
Boolean models tend to produce results in seconds whereas 
numeric results take on the order of minutes. In limited 
applications, this difficulty may be insignificant; however, as 
model size and complexity increases, it may become a 
hindrance to successful completion of calculation. 
 
 
Figure 4: Boolean node results and numeric node means ±1 σ 
8. Future Work - Combining SD and BBN for SCRM 
Industrial Dynamics was initially developed by Forrester 
in 1961 [14] and later extended into System Dynamics (SD) 
to capture the effects of feedback structures over time [15]. In 
the SD approach, companies are modeled as systems 
characterized by flows and stocks. Stocks are accumulations 
within the system and may represent inventories or abstract 
variables. Stocks are increased or decreased by flow variables 
that control movement of stock from sources to sinks or other 
stocks, where the sources and sinks represent the system 
boundary. Simulated managerial control is realized by 
changing flow variables which in turn change the levels of 
stock variables [16]. SD models have been applied to study a 
variety of SC issues. In Forrester’s original publication, a 
theoretical 4-link SC is modeled and studied for reactions to 
variations in their actual and target inventories. Forrester finds 
that ‘common sense’ strategies can amplify fluctuations in the 
demand of customers further up in the SC. Kumar and 
Nigmatullin [17], Vlachos et al. [18], and Peng et al. [19] 
apply SD to model dynamics to evaluate long-term planning 
policies and for ‘what if’ analyses in varying contexts. The 
key advantage of such models for risk modeling in the SC 
over BBN is explicitly capturing the long-term (often 
unexpected) influence of policy choices. 
A combined SD-BBN approach has been demonstrated 
by Mohaghegh [20]. The model can capture both the 
underlying dynamic causal mechanisms in a complex system 
through SD and the uncertainty through BBN. A key aspect of 
complex socio-technical systems is the dynamic effect caused 
by time delays and feedback loops. BBNs cannot cope with 
these effects in a reasonable way; the combination with SD 
compensates for the deficiencies of both models.  
 Applying this type of scheme to data-sparse scenarios 
could result in a more complete understanding of life-cycle 
risk exposure for the manufactured product. In a SD-BBN 
SCRA model, both the SD and BBN models would be created 
in parallel. BBN may provide probabilities as input values to 
the SD model. The SD model would then be run over a time 
step Δt and calculate outputs which could be fed back as 
probabilities into the BBN. Given this input, probabilities of 
the SD model inputs from BBN may change. Through 
iteration, trend vectors of the inputs (Z) and outputs (Y) of the 
SD model could be determined. This process is illustrated in 
Figure 5 for a simple example where risk nodes in BBN are 
represented as ovals; shaded nodes have direct linkage to the 
SD model. The SD-BBN approach creates a connection 
between the input and output nodes that does not exist within 
the BBN (connection X in Figure 5) effectively capturing 
dynamic feedback.  
The combination of SD and BBN offers a number of 
benefits for SC risk analysis including the ability to simulate 
feedback and time delays. In LCA, a model that simulates the 
amount of reusable or reused parts over the product life-cycle 
is conceivable. This allows creating scenarios and what-if 
studies for a sustainable SC even with limited knowledge 
about the future environment.  
However, issues and limitations are created by the 
combined SD-BBN approach. Managing the connection 
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within the BBN created by using the SD model is one of 
them. This connection affects ability to enter observations into 
the BBN as done before. This and other issues must be 
overcome through further modeling and analysis. 
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Figure 5: Integrated SD and BBN models 
9. Conclusions 
This paper compared Boolean and numeric methods for 
quantifying life-cycle risk probabilities for SC risk 
assessment. Ultimately, both methods of analysis result in the 
ability to prioritize risk management activities based on 
probabilities of risk event occurrence. However, some insights 
into the nature of the available information can be gained 
through numeric modeling as opposed to Boolean. Using 
numeric nodes allows for uncertainty inherent to relying on 
highly speculative expert opinion for modeling to be captured. 
Numeric modeling is more computationally expensive; 
therefore, it should only be applied when risk probability 
uncertainty is high and data is scarce. This method may alter 
the risk management prioritization compared to Boolean 
modeling, where certainty is assumed. Finally, opportunities 
for combining SD models with BBN risk modeling for more 
robust, predictive risk management have been discussed. 
While the literature combining these methods is currently 
limited, potential insights gained through further model 
development could yield valuable tools for SCRM.    
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